Supervaluationism and Relativism are popular accounts of future contingents. Even though they differ quite radically, they agree, at least in their most common forms, in how they evaluate present utterances about the future. For instance, consider the sentence A = ‘The coin will come down heads’ as it is evaluated from the present time t. Both the supervaluationist and the relativist will say: A is (a) supertrue at t/(with respect to t) just in case there is no objective chance at t that A is false, (b) superfalse at t/(with respect to t) just in case there is no objective chance at t that A is true, (c) neither supertrue nor superfalse otherwise.
In general, supervaluationism and relativism seem to fare better as accounts of future contingents than as theories of vagueness, since there is no equivalent of the problem of higher-order vagueness for future contingents. In this note, I will try to challenge this assumption by pointing to a problem which seems to arise for supervaluationism and relativism with respect to future contingents without being as problematic in the case of vagueness.